ABSTRACT

What Ralph Nader's spoiler role in the 2000 presidential election tells us about the American political system. Why Montana went to court to switch the 1990 apportionment to Dean's method. How the US tried to use game theory to win the Cold War, and why it didn't work. When students realize that mathematical thinking can address these sorts of pres

part 1|2 pages

Part I: Voting

chapter |2 pages

Introduction to Part I

chapter 1|20 pages

Two Candidates

chapter 2|20 pages

Social Choice Functions

chapter 3|16 pages

Criteria for Social Choice

chapter 4|18 pages

Which Methods Are Good?

chapter 5|14 pages

Arrow’s Theorem

chapter 6|28 pages

Variations on the Theme

chapter |4 pages

Notes on Part I

part 2|2 pages

Part II: Apportionment

chapter |2 pages

Introduction to Part II

chapter 7|16 pages

Hamilton’s Method

chapter 8|22 pages

Divisor Methods

chapter 9|18 pages

Criteria and Impossibility

chapter 10|14 pages

The Method of Balinski and Young

chapter 11|14 pages

Deciding among Divisor Methods

chapter |6 pages

Notes on Part II

part 3|2 pages

Part III: Conflict

chapter |2 pages

Introduction to Part III

chapter 13|18 pages

Strategies and Outcomes

chapter 14|18 pages

Chance and Expectation

chapter 15|18 pages

Solving Zero-Sum Games

chapter 16|22 pages

Conflict and Cooperation

chapter 17|18 pages

Nash Equilibria

chapter 18|20 pages

The Prisoner’s Dilemma

chapter |4 pages

Notes on Part III

part 4|2 pages

Part IV: The Electoral College

chapter |2 pages

Introduction to Part IV

chapter 19|20 pages

Weighted Voting

chapter 20|14 pages

Whose Advantage?

chapter |4 pages

Notes on Part IV